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Abstract: 
I examine the reasons Aristotle presents in Physics VIII 8 for denying a crucial 
assumption of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox: that every motion is composed of sub-
motions. Aristotle claims that a unified motion is divisible into motions only in potentiality 
(δυνάμει). If it were actually divided at some point, the mobile would need to have 
arrived at and then have departed from this point, and that would require some interval 
of rest. Commentators have generally found Aristotle’s reasoning unconvincing. Against 
David Bostock and Richard Sorabji, inter alia, I argue that Aristotle offers a plausible and 
internally consistent response to Zeno. 
I defend Aristotle’s reasoning by using his discussion of what to say about the 
mobile at boundary instants, transitions between change and rest. There Aristotle 
articulates what I call the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule: what is true of 
something at a boundary instant is what is true of it over the time of its rest. By contrast, 
predications true of something over its period of change are not true of the thing at either 
of the boundary instants of that change. I argue that this rule issues from Aristotle’s 
general understanding of change, as laid out in Phys. III. It also fits well with Phys. VI, 
where Aristotle maintains that there is a first boundary instant included in the time of rest, 
but not a “first in which the mobile began to change.” 
I then show how this rule underlies Aristotle’s argument that a continuous motion 
cannot be composed of actual sub-motions. Aristotle distinguishes potential middles, 
points passed through en route to a terminus, from actual middles. The Changes are 
Open, Rests are Closed Rule only applies to actual middles, because only they are 
boundaries of change that the mobile must arrive at and then depart from. On my 
reading, Aristotle argues that the instant of arrival, the first instant at which the mobile 
has come to be at the actual middle, cannot belong to the time of the subsequent 
motion. If it did, the mobile would already be moving towards the next terminus and thus, 
per Phys. VI 6, would have already left. But it cannot have moved away from the 
midpoint at the very same moment it has arrived there. This means that the instant of 
arrival must be separated from the time of departure by an interval of rest. I show how 
Aristotle’s reasoning applies generally to rule out any continuous reflexive motion or 
continuous complex rectilinear motion. On my interpretation, however, the argument 
does not apply to every change of direction. When, as in the case of projectile motion, 
multiple movers and their relative powers explain why the mobile changes directions, 
distinct sub-motions are not involved. Aristotle holds that such motions cannot be 
continuous, not because they involve intervals of rest, but because they involve multiple 
causes of motion. My interpretation of the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule 
allows us to make better sense of Aristotle’s argument than any previous interpretation. 
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A. Zeno’s Dichotomy Paradox and Aristotle’s Two Responses 
The paradoxes of Zeno of Elea offer some of the most intriguing arguments 
against motion ever made. Aristotle discusses four of Zeno’s paradoxes in his Physics. 
Each of these paradoxes derives some impossibility from the assumption of motion. 
Zeno’s first paradox, the dichotomy paradox, purports to show that in order for a mobile 
to complete any motion it must go through the infinite. Completing a motion requires 
going through an infinite number of half-distances, but this is impossible in any finite 
time, so motion is impossible. If Socrates walks up from the Piraeus to Athens, he must 
first go half the distance. Before going half the distance, he must go through half of the 
half and so on ad infinitum: Socrates will have to go through infinite half-distances in 
order to get from the Piraeus to Athens. Every motion requires going through the infinite, 
since in each case one must go through all the infinite half-distances. This is impossible 
in any given finite time, so motion is impossible in a finite time.1  
Aristotle addresses Zeno’s dichotomy paradox on three different occasions in the 
Physics (Phys). He mentions the dichotomy paradox at Phys VI 9, 239b10-14 only to 
dismiss it, referring back to VI 2 where he argued that the infinite half-distances within a 
given finite distance can be traversed in the given finite time. According to Aristotle, 
Zeno’s paradox brings out an equivocation on the meaning of infinite. Continuous things 
are said to be infinite (ἄπειρον) in two ways. They can be called infinite “either according 
                                                
1 My formulation of this argument is based on Aristotle’s discussion in Phys. VI 2, 
233a12-21 and VI 9, 239b10-14. 
2 For further discussion of Aristotle on the infinite see Coope 2012 and Cooper 2016. 
3 Cf. B. Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: 1919); A. Grünbaum, 
Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes (Middletown, CT, 1967); W. C. Salmon, Zeno's 
Paradoxes, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis: 2001). 
See G. Vlastos, ‘A Zenonian Argument against Plurality’, in Studies in Greek Philosophy, 
i. The Presocratics (Princeton, 1993), 219-40 [originally in J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (eds.), 
Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (New York, 1971), 119-44] for an important statement of the 
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to division or with respect to their limits” (Phys VI 2, 233a25-6). Continuous things are 
said to be quantitatively infinite when they do not have limits, as a line is said to be 
infinitely long when its length is not limited. They are said to be infinitely divisible when 
their continuous quantity can always be subdivided. A quantitatively infinite distance 
cannot be traversed in a finite time, but the infinite half-distances within the finite 
distance from the Piraeus to Athens can be traversed in a finite time since “time itself is 
also infinite in this way” (Phys VI 2, 233a29). Even if the distance from the Piraeus to 
Athens were to be infinitely divided, the journey of Socrates would still take two hours 
since the time of the journey would be infinitely divided in exactly the same way as the 
length. 
Thus Aristotle’s first response is to say that the paradox dissolves once one 
distinguishes between these two ways of being infinite. Magnitudes, motions, and times 
are infinite according to division (there is no limit to the number of divisions one can 
make in them), but they are not infinite with respect to their boundaries or limits.2 
Traversing a quantitatively infinite distance would be impossible in a finite time, but 
traversing an infinitely divisible distance is not a problem. However, Aristotle returns to 
the dichotomy paradox in Phys VIII and presents it in what he thinks is a more 
challenging form.  
Here Aristotle brings out a difficulty implied in the notion of infinite divisibility, 
apart from any relation of time and distance. If we grant that, before a mobile can 
traverse a given distance, half the distance must be traversed and so on ad infinitum, 
then it will need to go through an infinite number of half-distances. If we number each of 
                                                
2 For further discussion of Aristotle on the infinite see Coope 2012 and Cooper 2016. 
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the half-distances the mobile goes through, “having gone through the whole, it follows 
that we will have counted an infinite number; and this, admittedly, is impossible.” (Phys 
VIII 8, 263a9-11) Aristotle then states that his earlier answer was dialectically sufficient, 
but did not reveal the full truth of the matter. (263a15-22) If there are an infinite number 
of times numbered, then this collection of times will itself be infinite. This would mean 
that motion would require going through or numbering infinite things, something Aristotle 
concedes is impossible in a finite time.  
We can put the reformulated dichotomy paradox thus: 
A) Any motion requires going through an infinite number of distances (since to 
traverse a given distance one must go through or number all its infinite half-
distances, 263a5-10) 
B) Going through an infinite number of distances is impossible in any finite time 
(an assumption Aristotle accepts, 263a10-11) 
C) Any motion is impossible in a finite time (from A and B) 
 
Contemporary thinkers have predominantly taken the structure of space and time to be 
atomistic, with time and space being composed out of dimensionless points, and they 
have responded to Zeno on this basis.3 Their response is to deny premise B) by noting a 
mathematical fact: if we add all the half-distances together (1/2+1/4+1/8+…), their sum 
converges on the whole distance but will never exceed it. This suggests that the infinite 
number of half-distances could be gone through or numbered without taking an infinite 
time, making premise B) false. 
                                                
3 Cf. B. Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: 1919); A. Grünbaum, 
Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes (Middletown, CT, 1967); W. C. Salmon, Zeno's 
Paradoxes, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis: 2001). 
See G. Vlastos, ‘A Zenonian Argument against Plurality’, in Studies in Greek Philosophy, 
i. The Presocratics (Princeton, 1993), 219-40 [originally in J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (eds.), 
Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (New York, 1971), 119-44] for an important statement of the 
arithmetical understanding of Zeno’s arguments. 
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Now Aristotle is aware of this fact about half-distances, as evidenced in Phys III 
6, 206b3-11. He does not, however, make use of it in responding to Zeno. Consequently, 
those interpreters who think that Zeno’s paradoxes are to be resolved by appealing to 
the mathematics of infinite series often find fault with Aristotle’s response. However, as 
Pieter Sjoerd Hasper has argued, Zeno’s paradoxes are best understood not as 
mathematical problems but as metaphysical ones. 4  Zeno’s arguments rest on 
mereological claims: if the whole is nothing other than the sum of the parts and the parts 
are unlimited, then the whole must be unlimited in a similar way. We should not be 
surprised that Aristotle objects primarily to Zeno’s metaphysics, not his mathematics. 
Aristotle’s own metaphysical commitments concerning, inter alia, mereology, the nature 
of the continuous, and the infinite prevent him from straightforwardly endorsing the 
mathematical response to Zeno.5 
                                                
 4 Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, ‘Zeno Unlimited’, OSAP 30 (2006), 49-85. 
5 To begin with, Aristotle denies that continuous entities are (or could be) composed out 
of indivisible parts (Physics VI 1, 231a21-232a22). In this respect, Aristotle’s theory of the 
continuous resembles contemporary gunky theories, according to which continuous entities can 
be composed out of atomless gunk, which is always divisible into smaller parts (though on gunky 
theories these parts are all actual, whereas for Aristotle these parts are merely potential). Cf. J. 
Schaffer, ‘Is There a Fundamental Level?’, Nous, 37 (2003): 498-517); Dean Zimmerman, ‘Could 
Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts? An Argument for “Atomless Gunk” ’, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, 56 (1996), 1-29. 
Further, Aristotle rejects views of the continuity of motion that make time prior to motion, 
since in his view the dependency goes the other way. (Physics IV 12, 220b25-221b23; cf. IV 13) 
He also rejects reductive analyses of motion: motion is an incomplete and in process way of 
being that cannot be reduced to a sequences of times and locations (Physics III 3). For further 
discussion of the differences between Aristotle’s conception of motion and contemporary at-at 
analyses, see Michael J. White, The Continuous and the Discrete: Ancient Physical Theories 
from a Contemporary Perspective (Oxford, 1992) 58-9 and 109-115. 
Finally, Aristotle also famously denies that there can be anything that is infinite in a fully 
complete or actual way (Physics III 6-8). He does not think that I can do an infinite number of 
things in a finite time or complete an infinite series of tasks. 
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While some commentators, such as KRS, have assimilated Aristotle’s response 
to the mathematical one, Aristotle’s rejoinder is, in fact, quite different. 6  Aristotle 
concedes that premise B) is true and attacks premise A).7 Aristotle responds to the 
reformulated paradox by making a distinction: the mobile goes through the infinite in 
capacity (δυνάμει), but not in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ).8 Aristotle claims that premise A) is 
false when interpreted as requiring the mobile to go through an actually infinite number 
of distances.9 Aristotle’s final response to the paradox is to deny that a continuous 
motion can be made up of multiple actual sub-motions. The mobile only actually goes 
                                                
6 KRS acknowledges the distinction between two ways of reading premises 1) and 2) laid 
out in this paragraph, but they only discuss the potentially infinite formulation of the argument, 
where premise 2) is rejected (271). Thus their discussion ends up assimilating Aristotle’s 
response to the mathematical response and fails to sufficiently consider why Aristotle rejects 
premise 1) when it is interpreted as speaking of the actually infinite. 
7 Since the classical modern conception formulates continuity in terms of being 
successively at infinitely many locations at infinitely many times, contemporary theorists using this 
conception of continuity are not in a position to deny A). 
Further, many of them hold that B) is false even if there are an infinite number of motions 
separated by intervals of rest. Grünbaum, with the help of Friedberg, formulated the staccato run, 
a version of the dichotomy scenario on which the runner would complete an infinite number of 
tasks, pausing between each one for successively shorter times (Grünbaum 215-6). While some 
have claimed that such a run would not be consistent with classical dynamics (Burke 2000), 
others have defended it as both logically and physically possible by providing dynamic models 
that would satisfy what they take to be the relevant constraints. (Laraudogoitia 2006 and Lee 
2013) 
This points again to the significant differences between Aristotle’s understanding of 
continuity and typical contemporary conceptions. 
8 I will sometimes use “actually” and “potentially” and cognates to translate ἐνεργείᾳ and 
δυνάμει and cognates, partly because these terms are easier to consistently render across 
cognates than exercise and capacity and partly because these terms are the standard English 
translations (via Latin usage). Nevertheless, I agree with Jonathan Beere in thinking that, for 
Aristotle, these two terms pick out different ways of being rather than signifying purely modal 
claims about capacity. Cf. Beere’s discussion of Met. Θ 5 on being-in-capacity (2009, 152). So 
while I will use this language, I am understanding “potentially” and “actually” as making claims 
about different ways of being somewhere, not just different logical possibilities. 
9 If we instead take premises A) and B) of the reformulated argument to be speaking of a 
potentially infinite number of distances, not an actually infinite number, then Aristotle, in line with 
the mathematical response, would deny that premise B) is true (263b6-8). This formulation, 
however, is not significantly different from the original formulation because Aristotle takes the 
infinite divisibility of continuous quantities to imply a potentially infinite number of divisions (Phys. 
III 6, 206b4-19). 
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through one distance and performs one motion. Thus, Aristotle insists, there is no 
impossibility in motion (VIII 8, 263a23-263b8). 
B. Overview 
Aristotle’s insistence that a continuous motion cannot be made up of actual sub-
motions is crucial not just for his response to Zeno, but also for two other important 
claims made in this chapter. First of all, it is the key premise of Aristotle’s strongest and 
most carefully laid out arguments for establishing that only circular motion can be 
everlastingly continuous (262a13-263a4). He also uses this claim about motion to 
criticize those natural philosophers who say that “all perceptible things are always 
moving.” (265a3-4) For Aristotle, something cannot always be in flux: it must first 
complete a change (whether of place, alteration, or growth) and have a period of rest 
before beginning a new change. Thus Aristotle’s views on this subject lie at the core of 
his picture of natural things as undergoing intrinsically goal-directed changes that have 
definite limits. Aristotle’s cosmos is finite and the only endless motions it can contain are 
the everlasting circular motions of the heavens. 
Aristotle introduces his core reasons for claiming that a continuous motion cannot 
be composed from a number of different motions earlier in Phys VIII 8. There Aristotle 
argues that when a motion is actually divided at some point the mobile must arrive at 
and then depart from this point and thus must rest. If this argument succeeds, one 
unified continuous motion cannot be composed out of multiple actual motions, since 
there would be intervals of rest in between, and a key premise of Zeno’s reformulated 
argument would prove false. However, commentators, including Richard Sorabji and 
David Bostock, have found Aristotle’s reasoning unconvincing, resting either on a fallacy 
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or begging the question.10 Further, several commentators, including Sarah Waterlow 
Broadie and Jacob Rosen, have argued that Aristotle’s claims here do not fit well with his 
own discussions of motion and continuity in books V and VI of the Physics.11 
In this paper, I defend Aristotle’s reasoning by using his discussion of what to say 
about the mobile at boundary instants, transitions between change and rest. I show that 
Aristotle articulates what I call the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule: what is 
true of something at a boundary instant is what is true of it over the time of its rest. By 
contrast, predications true of something over its period of change are not true of the 
thing at either of the boundary instants of that change.12 I argue that this rule issues from 
Aristotle’s general understanding of change, as laid out in Phys III 1-3. I then show that it 
in fact fits well with Phys VI, where Aristotle maintains that there is a first boundary 
instant included in the time of rest, but not a “first in which the mobile began to change.” 
To clarify the rule and its interpretation, I consider how Aristotle uses the Changes are 
Open, Rests are Closed Rule to argue against the possibility of continuous alteration. 
 I then show how this rule underlies Aristotle’s argument that a continuous motion 
cannot be composed of actual sub-motions. Aristotle distinguishes potential middles, 
                                                
10 Sorabji (Time, 323-4); Bostock, 120. White 1992, 54-62; and D. W. Graham (trans. and 
comm.), Aristotle: Physics Book VIII [Physics VIII] (Oxford: 1999), 141-3; 150-1 are not convinced 
by Aristotle’s reasoning but work harder to find a plausible construal. John Bowin has recently 
argued that Aristotle’s arguments are dialectical, using questionable premises to bring out the 
problems with Zeno’s arbitrary divisions of change (John Bowin, Aristotle on the Unity of Change: 
Five Reductio Arguments in Physics viii 8, Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010): 319-345). My 
interpretation makes such a move unnecessary. 
11 Sarah Broadie (Sarah Waterlow (Broadie), Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s 
Physics [Nature], (Oxford: 1982), 144-146; Jacob Rosen, “Physics V–VI versus VIII: Unity of 
Change and Disunity in the Physics,” in Mariska Leunissen (ed.), Aristotle's Physics, a Critical 
Guide, Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
12 The adjective “closed,” comes from the mathematical distinction between whether a 
boundary is included in an interval (in which case the interval is open with respect to that 
boundary) or not (in which case the interval is closed with respect to that boundary). I discuss this 
in detail in section E. 
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points passed through en route to a terminus, from actual middles, points that serve as 
actual termini. The Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule only applies to actual 
middles, because only they are boundaries of change, since each is, by definition, the 
terminus ad quem of one motion and the terminus a quo of the subsequent motion. The 
mobile must arrive at and then depart from an actual middle. 
On my reading, Aristotle argues that the instant of arrival, the first instant at 
which the mobile has come to be at the actual middle, cannot belong to the time of the 
subsequent motion. If it did, the mobile would already be moving towards the next 
terminus and thus, per Aristotle’s argument in Phys. VI 6, would have already left. But it 
cannot have moved away from the midpoint at the very same moment it has arrived 
there. This means that the instant of arrival must be separated from the time of departure 
by an interval of rest. I show how Aristotle’s reasoning applies generally to rule out any 
continuous reflexive motion or continuous complex rectilinear motion. On my 
interpretation, however, the argument does not apply to every change of direction. 
When, as in the case of projectile motion, multiple movers and their relative powers 
explain why the mobile changes directions, distinct sub-motions are not involved. The 
mobile need not have arrived at and then departed from any specific point, so the 
interval of rest argument does not apply. Aristotle needs other grounds for showing that 
such motions are not continuous. On my reading, Aristotle holds that such motions 
cannot be continuous precisely because these sorts of cases involve multiple causes of 
motion, contrary to his definition of continuous motion.  
 My interpretation of the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule allows us 
to make good sense of Aristotle’s argument for thinking that the mobile must stop at an 
actual middle. Aristotle is correct about the implications of his views on change: his rule 
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implies that there cannot be successive actual sub-motions without intervals of rest. 
Given that most interpreters take Aristotle’s position to beg the question or rest on a 
premise that is obviously mistaken, this is meaningful interpretative progress. By 
providing an account of Aristotle’s reasoning based on a rule that follows from his 
general account of change and also has some intrinsic plausibility, I show that Aristotle’s 
position is more defensible and plausible than commentators currently acknowledge, 
even if the rule on which he relies can be challenged. 
C. Aristotle on Why Actual Division Requires Stopping 
Aristotle’s claim—that a continuous motion cannot be composed of actual sub-
motions—is not an obvious one. Nothing appears immediately problematic about taking 
Socrates’ motion from the Piraeus to Athens to be composed of his motion from the 
Piraeus to a midpoint and his motion from the midpoint to Athens. This is precisely how 
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox gets some purchase on us. Further, Aristotle himself in Phys 
V and VI seems at several points to speak of motions as having parts that are 
themselves motions, as Sarah Waterlow Broadie and Jacob Rosen point out.13 What, 
then, entitles Aristotle to his strong claim? 
Earlier in Phys VIII 8, Aristotle distinguishes between division in capacity and 
actual division in order to show that motion in a straight line back and forth between two 
limits cannot be continuous. Aristotle notes, following his definition in book V, that a 
motion, if it is to be one and continuous, must be “the motion of one thing and in one 
time and in what is undivided according to species.” (VIII 8, 262a2-3; cf. V 4, 228b2-4) 
                                                
13 Relevant passages include Phys. VI 1, 232a8; VI 2, 232b7–8, a34–b2; VI 4, 235a18-
24; VI 6, 236b34–237a3; VI 7, 237b23–4. Waterlow, 144-146; Rosen, 214-218. Section D 
discusses how Phys. VIII 8 fits with Phys. VI. 
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Aristotle thinks that the most evident argument against the continuity of such a motion is 
that it will not be one in time (VIII 8, 262a13-a18).14 He claims that a mobile moving back 
and forth between limits must come to a stand before it doubles back and thus its 
movements will not be continuous. 15  Any rectilinear motion that requires changing 
directions at some point will fail to be unified and continuous (VIII 8, 262a1-18). 
This argument, crucial to establishing eternal circular motion and to Aristotle’s 
rejection of Zeno, has generally been found unimpressive. I will show that it rewards 
closer examination. Aristotle lays out two principles for his argument: 
there being three things, the beginning, the middle, and the end, the middle is 
both in relation to each, and is one in number, but two in account. Moreover, 
what is in capacity (τὸ δυνάμει) and what is in actuality (τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ) are 
different. (Phys. VIII 8, 262a19-23) 
 
Aristotle first applies these principles to a mobile moving along a straight line: 
Any of the points lying between the limits of the straight line is a middle in 
capacity (δυνάμει), but not in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), unless the mobile divides the 
line by stopping at that point and beginning its motion again. Thus, however, the 
middle does come to be a beginning and an end, a beginning of the later part, 
and end of the first part. (Phys. VIII 8, 262a23-27) 
 
Here Aristotle gives an example of the difference between being a middle in capacity 
and being a middle in actuality. Let us take B, one of the points lying between A and C, 
the limits of the straight line. If the mobile just passes through B en route, then B is a 
                                                
14 Aristotle initially argues that motion back and forth on a straight line (or any reflexive 
motion) will not be one and continuous because it will involve two contrary, and therefore 
different, species of motion (VIII 8, 262a6-a13), but he represents the argument based on time as 
the most evident and conclusive. 
15 It is important to note that this claim, if successfully defended, would also show that 
such a motion cannot consist of contiguous parts with a single instant serving as the end of one 
and the beginning of the other. Aristotle had, in Physics V, allowed for motions to be contiguous 
or successive by the limits of their times being one and continuous (V 4, 228a27-b1). If, however, 
reflexive motions (and other series of motions which require arriving at and then leaving a point) 
involve rest between each phase, they could not even be called contiguous and thus, since they 
do not touch one another and lack a common time, there would be no way to compose one 
motion from a number of these motions. 
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potential middle. It is a middle in capacity because the mobile passed through B and 
could have stopped there. It is not a fully actual middle because B was not actually the 
end or beginning of a motion; the mobile did not arrive at and depart from B, it just 
passed through. If, however, the mobile completes a motion to B and then begins 
another motion away from B, B will be an actual middle. It will be the terminus ad quem 
of the motion from A to B and the terminus a quo of the motion from B to C; one in 
number, but two in account, as Aristotle said. 
 Can B (or any midpoint) serve as a terminus and be an actual middle without any 
pause between the two motion? For example, can the post (καμπτήρ) marking the half-
way point of the Δίαυλος race serve as the end of the runner’s motion to it and the 
beginning of his motion away from it without requiring any intervening rest at the post? 
This might initially seem plausible. 
Aristotle disagrees. He uses the claim that the mobile must arrive at and then 
depart from an actual middle to argue that an interval of rest is always required: 
Whenever it is borne continuously, A cannot have come to be at (γεγονέναι) or 
have come to be away from (ἀπογεγονέναι) point B; it can only be [there] in the 
now (ἐν τῷ νῦν), not in any time except in the whole of which the now is a 
division. If some will posit that it has arrived at and has departed from [B], A, 
while being borne, will always stand. For it is impossible that A has come to be at 
B and has come to be away from [it] at the same time. So [it will have done so] at 
different points in time. Therefore what is in the middle will be time. Hence A will 
rest at B. Likewise in the case of the other points, for the same account applies to 
all. Thus whenever what is borne, A, uses the middle, B, both as an end and as a 
beginning, it is necessary that it stop, because of making [B] two, just as if it were 
understood [to be two]. But it has departed from point A as a beginning, and 
when it has finished and comes to a stop, it has arrived at C. (VIII 8, 262a28-
262b8, OCT text) 
 
To give a concrete example, Moschato, a point in between the Piraeus and Athens, will 
only be the midpoint of Socrates’ journey actually or actively if it is the end of the motion 
from the Piraeus to Moschato and the beginning of the motion from Moschato to Athens. 
13 
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It will only be the end of one motion and the beginning of the other if Socrates both 
completes his motion from the Piraeus to Moschato and then starts another motion from 
Moschato to Athens. But Socrates cannot complete his motion to Moschato and start his 
next motion at the same time, so he must pause. Thus, if Moschato is a midpoint in 
actuality, Socrates’ motion cannot be continuous, since it involves an interval of rest. Any 
motion that requires arriving at and then departing from a point cannot be continuous. 
D. The “Fallacious Instant of Departure” Interpretation 
Aristotle claims that the mobile must both have come to be at (γέγονε) the actual 
middle and have come to be away from (ἀπογέγονε) it.16 He then claims that there must 
be an interval of rest in between the mobile’s arrival and its departure. Interpreters do not 
have a problem with the first instant, the instant of arrival. Call this instant t1. In Phys VI 
5, Aristotle holds that there is a “first in which the change has finished” (236a8-9), and 
argues that this must be an initial indivisible moment at which the relevant movement 
(from A to B in this case) has been completed. (235b33-a13) T1 is thus the first instant at 
which the mobile is at B; it is the instant at which the mobile has arrived at or come to be 
at B. At each instant before t1 the mobile is still moving and is not yet at B. T1 is the first 
instant of having moved, before which there was continuous moving to B. 
The problem arises with Aristotle’s claim that the mobile must have come to be 
away from the actual middle. A number of commentators, including Richard Sorabji and 
David Bostock, claim that Aristotle commits an obvious fallacy here. He assumes that 
                                                
16 Both Daniel W. Graham and White note that this is the central premise (Graham 1999, 
139; White 1992, 54-55). Though initially inclined to take a reading similar to those of Sorabji and 
Bostock, White pursues the matter further and comes to a conclusion similar to mine, though, as 
he notes, does not manage to construe this argument as an ‘ordinary language’ one (White 1992, 
54-58). 
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there is an instant of departure when there is not. This becomes clear when we lay out 
the following reconstruction of the argument’s premises:17  
There is some time, call it t1, when Socrates has arrived at Moschato. 
1) Socrates is at Moschato at t1. (ex hypothesi) 
There is some time, call it t2, when Socrates has left Moschato. 
2) Socrates is not at Moschato at t2. (ex hypothesi) 
3) Socrates cannot be at and not at Moschato at the same time. (by definition) 
Therefore, 
4) t1 is not the same time as t2. (from 1-3) 
5) Every time is separated from every other time by an interval of time. (by 
definition) 
Therefore, 
6) There is an interval of time between t1 and t2. (from 4 and 5) 
During the interval between Socrates’ arrival at Moschato and his leaving Moschato, he 
must rest at Moschato. Therefore, 
7) Socrates is at rest for the interval from t1 to t2. 
Therefore, 
8) The motion of Socrates from the Piraeus to Athens is not continuous. 
The obvious mistake is taken to be 2), the assumption of t2, some particular time when 
Socrates has left Moschato. On the reading of Bostock and Sorabji, Aristotle assumes 
                                                
17 This construal of the argument and objection is seen in both Richard Sorabji (Time, 
324) and David Bostock, ‘Aristotle, Zeno, and the Potential Infinite’, in Space, Time, Matter, and 
Form: Essays on Aristotle’s Physics, (Oxford: 2006), 120. 
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that there is some first point of time at which Socrates has left Moschato. This 
assumption is false.  
There is no first instant of change. There is no instant of departure at which the 
mobile has come to be away from the midpoint. Instead, a continuous range of times 
follows the instant at which the mobile is at the midpoint and at all of these instants the 
mobile is no longer there. Either Socrates is still at Moschato, in which case he has not 
departed from it, or he is some distance away from it, in which case he has already 
departed, meaning that the instant in question cannot be the first instant of departure. 
We can take instants of time that are very close to Socrates’ departure, but there is no 
first instant there for us to pick out. 
This interpretation is, however, prima facie problematic because Aristotle seems 
to be well aware that there is not a first instant of having changed. Aristotle earlier 
argues at length that there cannot be such a thing (VI 6, 236b33-237b9, considered 
below in section D), an interpretative difficulty Richard Sorabji addresses only by 
asserting that Aristotle lacked a “firm grasp” of the continuity of change.18 In fact, we can 
make good sense of Aristotle’s reasoning. I will show that instead of burdening him with 
a commitment he explicitly rejects elsewhere, we can use Aristotle’s Phys VI views on 
changing and having changed to formulate a cogent and powerful interpretation of this 
passage. To do so, however, we need to better understand why Aristotle claims that the 
mobile must have come to be away from (ἀπογέγονε) the midpoint.  
                                                
18 Richard Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Instant of Change’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, supplementary vol. 50 (1976), 85. 
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E. Aristotle on Predications at Boundary Instants 
To reach this understanding, we need to look at a passage later in the chapter 
where Aristotle discusses what is true about a mobile at boundary instants, using the 
case of alteration: 
It is also clear that unless one makes the point of time dividing the earlier and 
later always be, with respect to the thing, of what is later (τοῦ ὑστέρου τῷ 
πράγματι), the same thing will be and not be at the same time, and when it has 
come to be, it will not be. The point, then, is common to both (to the earlier and to 
the later [time]), and is the same and one in number; in account, however, it is 
not the same (for it is the end of the one, but the beginning of the other). In the 
thing, however, it is always of the later condition (τοῦ ὑστέρου πάθους). Let the 
time in which be ACB, the object, D. This in time A is white and in time B is not 
white. So in C it is white and not white. For in any [instant] whatever (ἐν ὁτῳοῦν) 
of A it is true to say it is white, if it was white for this whole time, and in B not 
white, but C is in both. Thus one must not grant [that it is white] in every [now], 
but instead [in every now] except for the final now, C. This is already in the later 
time. And even if it was coming to be not white and white was perishing in the 
whole A, it has come to be or has perished (γέγονεν ἢ ἔφθαρται) in C. Hence, it 
is first true to say that it is white or not white in that instant. Otherwise, when it 
has come to be, it will not be and when it has perished, it will be; or it must be 
white and not-white at the same time and, generally, being and non-being. (Phys. 
VIII 8, 263b9-26) 
 
In this passage, Aristotle is making a general claim about the boundary instant 
separating a time in which the subject possessed one status (but was moving towards 
having a different status) from the time in which it has gotten its new status. The instant 
C is the boundary for two times: the earlier time AC, over which thing D was white, and 
the later time CB, over which thing D was not white. In general, Aristotle insists that if 
something has a certain status over a whole time, that status also applies to all the 
instants within that time. If thing D was white over the time AC, then it was white at any 
instant within that time. But this brings up a potential problem. If the instant C belongs to 
both of the whole times, AC and CB, in the same way, then both the predications that 
are true over AC and those that are true over CB will apply. Thing D is white over time 
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AC, so it is white at C. Thing D is not-white over time CB, so it is not-white at C. Thus at 
instant C, thing D is white and not-white: contradictory predicates would be true of the 
same thing at the same time.  
To avoid this, Aristotle says that the boundary instant should always be taken to 
belong to the later time, not the earlier one. W.D. Ross is not impressed with this move:  
To avoid the difficulty involved in admitting that at one moment a thing may both 
be and not be possessed of a certain quality, Aristotle here states the equally 
difficult view that while a moment belongs both to the time which ends at it and to 
that which begins at it, it ‘belongs to the later, i.e. to the later qualification, for the 
thing.19 (Ross 1936, 714)  
 
Ross is dubious about whether Aristotle’s position is at all plausible or merely an ad hoc 
invention. I will consider how we should interpret it, show that it issues from Aristotle’s 
earlier views on motion, and then lay out how it applies. 
To begin with, how should we interpret Aristotle’s claim? In my view, we can best 
articulate Aristotle’s view by employing the mathematical notions of closed and open 
intervals. These notions apply well to Aristotle’s understanding of continuous quantities 
on which they are conceptualized quasi-geometrically. A continuous quantity is closed if 
its limit points are included within the quantity and open if its limit points are not 
included.20 On my view, when Aristotle claims that “one must not grant [that it is white] in 
every [now], but instead [in every now] except for the final now, C.” we should read him 
as claiming that the time AC is open. It contains all the instants up to, but not including, 
its final limit, the instant C. This fits well with his next claim, that “[C] is already in the 
later time.” The succeeding time CB includes the instant C, so CB is closed at that limit. 
                                                
19 Cf. Graham 1999, “Whereas a modern interpreter might look at this move as a mere 
stipulation to avoid problems, Aristotle sees it as required by the facts themselves.” (144) 
20 Weisstein, “Closed Interval,” “Open Interval.” It is half-open if one of its limit points is 
not included within the interval, but the other is. 
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This interpretation allows instant C to function as the limit for both times while properly 
being included in only one, avoiding contradictory predications.21 The distinction between 
open and closed intervals is widely recognized as an important and valuable one, so 
there is no problem with the concept itself. 
The question, however, is why Aristotle insists that it is the latter time that is 
closed and the earlier one that is open. In fact, this claim is not arbitrary but follows from 
Aristotle’s views on motion, as expressed earlier in the Physics. Aristotle sees motion as 
a distinctive way of being, incomplete and in process. Aristotle describes motion as the 
“fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια) of the potential, as such.” (III 1, 201a11-12) During a motion, 
something’s potential is being made actual, but as long as the motion is ongoing this 
fulfillment is not yet complete. Aristotle illustrates with the example of building: 
For each thing is sometimes active (ἐνεργεῖν) and sometimes not. Take, for 
example, the buildable (οἰκοδομητόν). The activity (ἐνέργεια) of the buildable, 
as buildable, is building (οἰκοδόμησις). For its activity is either building or the 
house, but when the house is, the buildable no longer is. It is the buildable, 
however, which is being built. It is necessary, therefore, for building to be its 
activity. But building is, indeed, a certain motion (κίνησίς) and the same account 
will apply to the other motions.  (201b7-15) 
 
Aristotle is pointing out two things. First, the buildable is only being fulfilled or made 
actual when it is being employed in building. Bricks and mortar can be built with (they are 
                                                
21 Aristotle’s account of location offers further support for the importance he attaches on 
making distinctions even when the limit is one in number and for applying the closed/open 
distinction. In Physics III 4, Aristotle maintains that “the place is together with the thing. For the 
limits are together with the limited.” (212a30-31) The container and the thing contained share the 
same boundary: for example, the inside of the amphora touches and has the same limit as the 
wine it contains. This boundary, just as in the case of the now, is one in number, but two in 
account (the end of the wine and the beginning of the amphora). There is still a real difference for 
Aristotle. Indeed, he characterizes place as “the first immobile limit of the containing.” (a21-22) 
The place of something is given and defined by what does the limiting, not by what is being 
limited. The amphora, its shape and boundaries, give a location to the wine it contains. Thus the 
limit is a limit for both the thing contained and the container, but belongs primarily to the 
container. The contained thing is open with respect to its boundaries. 
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building materials even when not being used), but they only become actually buildable 
things when employed in constructing a house. Secondly, when the bricks and mortar 
have become a house, they are no longer buildable. When they are components of an 
actual built thing, they no longer have the potential to be used as the material for building 
(as long as the house persists). The completion of building is the end of the buildable as 
such. So, for Aristotle, the end and limit of the motion is outside of the motion itself and 
involves the thing having a fundamentally different status than it did while the motion was 
ongoing.22 
 In Phys. VI, Aristotle works out the implications of these facts about motion for 
the times of motions. Here he makes claims about both the beginnings and ends of 
motions. First, he notes that, “there is no first [part] either of what is changing or of the 
time in which it changes.” (VI 5, 236a36-7) Aristotle is claiming that there is no first 
instant at which something is changing. Insofar as something is moving it has already 
moved. If an apple is becoming red, it has already become partly red. If it were still 
entirely green without having ripened at all, it would not be true to say that it is becoming 
green, as its potentiality to become red would not be actualized at all. Thus the apple will 
already have come to be red (to some degree) at any instant of its ripening.23  
As we will see, this means that the initial boundary of a change is also not 
included in the whole time of the motion. Instead, it belongs to the preceding time of rest. 
If instant G separates the earlier time of rest, FG, from the subsequent time of motion, 
                                                
22 For further discussion of this passage see Graham 1988, Kosman 1969, Waterlow 
1982. 
23 Similarly, there is not a first part of the change in the thing undergoing the change. 
Whether we take some initial redness of the apple, or movement of the animal, or growth of the 
plant, there will always have been some earlier alteration or locomotion or growth, some 
preceding change in the thing. (VI 5, 236a13-37) 
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GH, G itself will belong to the time of rest and the mobile’s status at G will be determined 
by time FG. My view here is in line with Michael White’s interpretation of the instant of 
departure. In his discussion of Aristotle’s views on the beginning and end of motion, 
White presents and argues for understanding the instant of departure as the last instant 
of resting. It is the last instant of having not moved, after which there will be moving. 
Although Aristotle does not explicate this notion, it is the analogue of the instant of 
departure, to which Aristotle is explicitly committed, and it follows naturally from his 
denial of a first instant of change. It is similarly defined in terms of something stative, not 
something in motion.24  
 Aristotle’s denial of a first instant of changing leads him to the further claim that, 
“everything which is moving has moved before.” (VI 6, 236b33-34). If we take any instant 
within Socrates’ motion from the Piraeus to Moschato, Socrates will have already moved 
away from the Piraeus. No matter how early in Socrates’ motion we are, there will 
always be some previous interval of time during which he has already moved away from 
the Piraeus (236b34-237a30). If something is now moving, it has moved. This is the view 
that Sorabji and Bostock claim Aristotle is contradicting in Phys VIII. In fact, I will show 
that he is using this view—that if something is moving, it must have moved—to show 
that continuous motions cannot be composed of actual sub-motions. 
Aristotle’s views on what to say about the end of change in Phys VI also fit well 
with my interpretation of Phys VIII on boundary instants. He insists that there is, indeed, 
a “first in which the change has finished” (236a8-9), a first instant when the motion is 
over and the change is complete. With respect to D, the thing being altered, “it is first 
                                                
24 White 1992, 57. 
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true to say that it is white or not white in that now [i.e. C].” (263b23-4) If, as in the VIII 8 
example, D is white over time AC and then not-white over time CB, the now or instant C 
is the first point at which it can be said to have come to be not white and at which it can 
be said that the white in it has been destroyed. It is the “first in which the change has 
finished.” More generally, Aristotle is claiming that there is a first instant when the 
change has been completed and is no longer taking place.  
On my interpretation, Aristotle’s view of motion implies the claims he makes in 
Phys VIII. The boundary instant, as the first instant when the change has been 
completed, must belong to the subsequent period. Thus the predications that applied to 
the mobile during its previous motion no longer apply. More generally, we have seen that 
Aristotle insists that there is no first instant of motion and no last instant. This means that 
the times of motions are open (they do not include their end limits). On my interpretation, 
Aristotle’s metaphysics of change implies a Changes are Open, Rests are Closed 
Rule: 
What is true of something at a boundary instant is what is true of it over the time 
of its rest, whether that time of rest precedes or is subsequent to the time of the 
change; predications true of something over its period of change are not true of 
the thing at either of the boundary instants. 
Times of change or motion are always open: they do not include either a first instant or 
last instant of change. Times of rest, by contrast, include their boundaries. There is a 
first instant of rest or completion and a last instant of resting, after which there is motion. 
F. Rest at an Instant and Predications at Instants  
 My interpretation might seem to be in tension with some of the views on time and 
rest that Aristotle expresses in VI 8. There he claims that just as there is no first in which 
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something moves or comes to a stop, so “neither is there a first when the resting thing 
rested.” (οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ὅτε πρῶτον ἠρέμησεν ἔστιν) (239a12) Aristotle goes 
on to argue against both a first instant of rest and a first interval of rest. He argues that 
just as there can be no moving in what is indivisible, so there can be no resting in what is 
indivisible. Thus an instant is not the sort of thing that could be a candidate for when the 
first rest happens. (239a12-14) On the other hand, there can be no first interval of rest, 
because the supposed first interval could always be divided into parts, one of which 
would be prior. (239a14-19) Aristotle maintains that the lack of a first follows from the 
continuous character of the entities involved: 
The cause of this is that everything rests and is moving in time, and there is not a 
first time, nor a first magnitude, nor, in general any first continuous [thing]; for 
these are all infinitely divisible.25 (239a20-23) 
 
He later says that “neither moving nor resting are in the now” (239b2-3) (οὔτε γὰρ 
κινεῖσθαι οὔτ’ ἠρεμεῖν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ νῦν) Does Aristotle’s rejection of a first instant of 
rest call into question my Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule? 
 Aristotle’s remarks show that he denies a first instant of rest in the sense of a first 
time over which rest is taking place. This, however, is not the sort of instant of 
completion that my Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule implies. VI 8 does not 
give us reason to reject the idea that the boundary instants should be included with the 
period of rest as opposed to the period of change. After all, it is not only in book VIII that 
Aristotle associates the boundaries with rest instead of change.  As I noted earlier, in VI 
5 Aristotle argues that there is a “first in which the change has finished” 
(τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ μεταβέβληκε) (236a8-9), where this first is an instant. I take Aristotle’s 
                                                
25Tούτου  δ’ αἴτιον ὅτι ἠρεμεῖ μὲν καὶ κινεῖται πᾶν ἐν χρόνῳ, χρόνος δ’ οὐκ ἔστι πρ
ῶτος οὐδὲ μέγεθος οὐδ’ ὅλως συνεχὲς οὐδέν· ἅπαν γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρα μεριστόν 
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claim there to imply that the predications that are true of the thing once it has completed 
the change apply at that instant (and going forward, for as long as it rests in that state). 
The appropriate predications for the first instant of completion or rest depend on the 
mobile’s status during the period of rest. There is a first instant at which the mobile 
became pale or got to Athens or completed its growth and that instant is the first at 
which it is true to say that it is white, is grown, or is in Athens. It is in this sense that there 
is a first instant of rest or completion.  Conversely, his denial in VI 5 that there is a “first 
in which the mobile began to change” (τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἤρξατο μεταβάλλειν) implies 
that there is no instant or temporal interval at which it is first true to claim that the mobile 
is changing (e.g. becoming white, moving to Athens, or growing). 
My interpretation concedes that, strictly speaking, the mobile neither moves nor 
rests over any instant, since motion or rest require an extended (hence divisible) time. 
However, the mobile will either be moving or resting over the temporal interval in which 
an instant is included. This allows for a derivative sense in which the mobile can be said 
to be in motion or at rest in the instant. The mobile is in this state at the instant insofar as 
it is in that state over the whole time in which this particular instant is included. Aristotle 
clearly thinks that predications that are true over the whole time can rightly be applied to 
the instants included in it. This is precisely how he reasons about boundary instants at 
263b19-20: “for in any [instant] whatever (ἐν ὁτῳοῦν) of A it is true to say it is white, if it 
was white for this whole time [A].” If we pick an instant halfway through Usain Bolt’s 
record-setting 100m sprint, he will not be running in the instant itself. Nevertheless, it is 
still true to say that he is running at that instant insofar as that instant is included in the 
larger temporal interval throughout which he is running. 
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G. Using Boundary Instants against Continuous Alteration 
Another example from later on in the chapter provides further evidence for my 
view that changes do not include their boundary instants. It also shows why this claim is 
crucial for Aristotle’s overall position on the need for intervals of rest between changes. 
In this passage, Aristotle is presenting an argument against the continuity of reflexive 
alteration. Aristotle is arguing that it is impossible for something to undergo an alteration 
(into white, in the example) and then immediately, without any rest, undergo an opposite 
alteration (out of white and into not-white, in the example). 
for at the same time not-white has been destroyed and white has come to be. If, 
then, the alteration into white and out of white is continuous and [the mobile] 
does not remain [white] for some time, at the same time not-white has been 
destroyed [ἔφθαρται] and white has come to be [γέγονε] and not-white has 
come to be [γέγονε]. For there will be the same time of the three. (264b3-6) 
 
We can see the role that Aristotle’s views on motion and rest play here when we 
explicate the example. Let the mobile D be becoming white over time AC and then be 
becoming not-white over time CB. On this scenario, the instant C0 is the first instant of 
having completed the change, since it is the endpoint of time AC, the time over which the 
mobile is altering to white. This means that at instant C0 the mobile has become white 
and not-white has been destroyed. As we have seen, since time AC is the time over 
which mobile D is becoming white, the time at which it is white, instant C0 must fall 
outside this time, given Aristotle’s views on change. C0 is the first instant in which the 
change has finished. This is why Aristotle claims that, at instant C0, white has come to 
be and not-white has been destroyed. White coming to be and not-white being destroyed 
are the actualities of the change, what the change produced, and so these claims are 
true at the boundary of the change, its outside limiting point. 
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Now why does Aristotle say that not-white “has come to be” at this very same 
instant? This, again, goes back to Aristotle’s view of motion: “the actuality of the 
alterable, as alterable, is alteration.” (201a12-3) Something is altering insofar as it is 
actually being altered: something is whitening insofar as it is actually being whitened. As 
we saw, Aristotle argues in Phys. VI 5-6 that insofar as something is moving it has 
already moved. If an apple is becoming red, it has already become partly red. If it were 
still entirely green without having ripened at all, it would not be true to say that it is 
becoming green, as its potentiality to become red would not have been actualized at all. 
Thus the apple will already have come to be red (to some degree) at any instant of its 
ripening. 
In our example, mobile D is, ex hypothesi, becoming not-white during the whole 
time CB, without any break or pause from its previous alteration to white. Given that it is 
becoming white during the whole time CB, at any instant within that time, it will have 
actualized its potential to some degree and thus will have come to be not-white to some 
degree. Now since instant C0 is not part of the previous time, AC, it must be part of this 
subsequent time, CB. Instant C0 is part of the whole time and the mobile immediately 
starts becoming not-white. This means that, at instant C0, it must already have become 
not-white to some degree. Thus we get a contradiction. At instant C0, the mobile has 
become white and not-white has been destroyed, since it is the terminus of the alteration 
to white, the first instant at which the mobile has changed. However, because C0 is, ex 
hypothesi, part of time CB during which the mobile is becoming not-white, the mobile has 
also become not-white at C0.  
The way to resolve this contradiction is to deny that the mobile immediately alters 
to not-white. If there is a period of rest before the mobile starts altering again, a period 
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that includes its limits, then the contradiction disappears. Generally, Aristotle claims that, 
in any change, the mobile must have arrived at the terminus and rested there before 
undergoing any other motion. This is true whether we are talking about alteration, growth 
and diminution, generation and corruption, or change of place.  
Now, one might object that there is another way to avoid the contradiction that 
does not require such a definite rule: we can just not include instant C0 with either time 
AC or time CB. If it is part of neither time, then no problems arise, as there is no need to 
apply contradictory predicates to the mobile at C0. But this means that we do not know 
what to predicate about the mobile at instant C0 (e.g. is it white or not-white? has it come 
to be white?), nor are we in a position to affirm that the initial alteration to white has 
actually been completed, since we do not have grounds for claiming that at instant C0 the 
change has actually been completed. Even more seriously, for Aristotle, an instant that 
does not measure either motion or rest cannot be its own independent time, or, in fact, 
be at all. Aristotle defines time as “the number of motion according to before and after.” 
(Phys. IV 11, 220a25-6) Time exists as a measure of motion and, incidentally, of rest 
(Phys IV 12, 221b7-23): it has no independent existence. Different times measure 
different motions or rests. Time is not composed of instants, rather we can take instants 
or nows because there is a whole motion or rest that they measure. If there is no change 
or motion or no whole time to measure, there could not be an independently existing 
instant of time. Thus for Aristotle every instant needs to be part of some continuous 
whole time.26 
                                                
26 For a comprehensive discussion of Aristotle’s views on time see Coope 2005. 
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H. Aristotle’s Reasoning Applied to the Actual Midpoints of Local Motion 
Now, how does the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule apply to local 
motion? Why, precisely, does Aristotle claims the mobile must rest at an actual middle, a 
place that the mobile has come to be at (γέγονε) and then has come to be away from 
(ἀπογέγονε)? Aristotle’s use of the perfect tense here is significant, since much of the 
force of his reasoning comes from the completed aspect denoted by γεγονέναι, “to 
have come to be at” or “to have arrived at” and ἀπογεγονέναι, “to have come to be 
away from” or “to have departed from,” as Daniel Graham rightly points out.27 Both 
Graham and White argue that Aristotle uses the perfect to signify a continuing state or 
achievement that is the result and goal of some prior activity or motion. The perfect 
stresses “an actual continuing state,” as Graham puts it, one that is achieved through the 
completion of a process.28 As White notes, the process leading to the goal needs to be 
finished “in a ‘semantic’ as opposed to a merely temporal sense.”29 It is only appropriate 
to apply the perfect to the coming to be of something when that thing is in a completed 
state of being as a result of a successfully completed process. In the case of motion, one 
motion must have been completed and then the other must have begun. This allows 
Aristotle to run the same kind of argument we saw in his rejection of reflexive alteration. 
On my interpretation, instead of fallaciously assuming a first instant of change, we 
should read Aristotle as implicitly relying on the Phys VI claim that whatever is changing 
has changed to argue for distinct times separated by rest. 
                                                
27 Graham 1999, 139. Graham does, however, run into the same interpretative difficulty 
as Sorabji and Bostock when he analyzes Aristotle’s argument (VIII 8, 262b23-262a3) that a 
reflexive motion cannot be continuous (Ibid., 141-143). 
28 Graham 1980, 125. 
29 White 1980, 255 Cf. Lyons 1972, 113. 
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So, how does the argument work on my reading? The mobile has arrived at B, 
precisely because B is the actual terminus of its initial motion.30 The mobile must have 
completed a motion to B. This is what distinguishes arriving at or coming to be at B from 
passing through B as a potential part of a larger motion that is not yet fully actualized. 
This is also what ensures that the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule applies. 
Both when B is a potential middle and when it is an actual middle, the mobile will be at B 
at some instant. However, when the mobile is just passing through, it is moving to some 
different destination and so that instant is not an actual boundary or limit that serves as a 
terminus and fulfills the mobile’s capacity. 
Given, however, that B is an actual middle, the mobile must be at B and must 
have moved to B at t1, the instant of arrival. The Changes are Open, Rests are Closed 
Rule implies that t1 cannot be part of the time over which the mobile was moving to B. 
Instead, it must go with the subsequent time. The mobile has at t1 whatever status it will 
have over the whole subsequent time BC. Ex hypothesi, however, its motion is 
continuous. We are assuming that there is another motion from B to C that occurs right 
after the time of the mobile’s motion to B without any intervening pause. In our example, 
Socrates will go right from moving to Moschato into moving to Athens, without any 
                                                
30 Aristotle’s understanding of the implications of γέγονε, “having arrived at” and 
ἀπογέγονε “having departed from” fit with ancient Greek usage and with ordinary English uses of 
perfect predications. If you are taking the train from the Piraeus to Athens and the train stops in 
Moschato, you certainly might say that, “We’ve arrived in Moschato.” Once the train starts up you 
might say “We’ve departed from Moschato.” If you are on an express train which passes through 
Moschato but does not stop there, you would probably not speak of arriving at or departing from 
Moschato. When the train is passing through the Moschato station you might say, “We’re in 
Moschato right now,” or “We’re just passing through Moschato,” but you would avoid speaking of 
arriving at and departing from. Similarly, if you take the express train and someone later asks you 
whether you have been to Moschato: you would probably say that you have passed through it. 
You would not unqualifiedly say that you have been there, however, because you never stopped 
or rested there. It has never been your destination or even a stopping point. Aristotle’s 
understanding of motion and continuity, then, fits well with how we speak and understand things. 
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pause. This, however, means time BC, the time of the subsequent motion is the only 
time that can include t1. Thus the instant of arrival would also turn out to be part of 
Socrates’ motion from Moschato to Athens.  
This implies that Socrates is moving to Athens at t1. But, if this is true, then we 
know from Phys. VI that Socrates has moved away from Moschato and towards Athens 
at t1. This is true of all instants that are part of the time of Socrates’ motion from 
Moschato to Athens, so it must be true of t1. This, again, produces a contradiction. At t1 
the mobile has arrived at B and is at B, since t1 is the first instant at which it has 
completed its motion to B. However, at t1 it has moved away from Moschato, since, ex 
hypothesi, it is moving from Moschato towards Athens at t1. These predications cannot 
be true at the same time—something cannot have arrived at a place and be moving 
away from it at the same instant.  
Applying the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule thus allows us to 
make good sense of the text of Aristotle’s argument for thinking that the mobile must 
stop at an actual middle: 
For it is impossible that A has arrived at B and has departed from [it] at the same 
time. So [it will have done so] at different points in time. Therefore what is in the 
middle will be time. Hence A will rest at B. (262b1-4) 
 
Arriving at B and then departing from B requires rest. If B is an actual midpoint, the 
mobile must pause there. We now have a reconstruction of the argument that is based 
on Phys. VI instead of conflicting with it, avoiding the worry about inconsistency put 
forward by Broadie and Rosen. This interpretation also leaves us with an argument 
based on defensible premises, not on an obvious mistake, à la Bostock and Sorabji.  
We can now formally lay out the premises and conclusion. Let us assume that 
Moschato is an actual midpoint of Socrates’ motion. Therefore, there is some instant of 
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time when Socrates has arrived at Moschato and completed his motion to it. We will call 
this instant of arrival, t1. 
1) T1 is the first instant at which Socrates is at Moschato (ex hypothesi) 
Let AB be the time of motion from the Piraeus to Moschato, of which t1 is the closed 
endpoint. The Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule then implies 
2) T1 is not included in the whole time AB, the interval of time over which Socrates is 
moving from the Piraeus to Moschato (from the Changes are Open, Rests are 
Closed Rule) 
But t1 must be part of some larger interval of time, as Aristotle clearly assumes in 263b9-
25, when he is determining the mobile’s status at a boundary instant. Aristotle is 
assuming throughout VIII 8 that every instant must be part of some larger interval of 
time. As I discussed at the end of section G, this fits with Aristotle’s understanding of 
time as a measure of motion. Just as every instantaneous position is grounded in the 
larger motion or rest it is part of, so any instant of time is grounded in the larger time 
interval that includes it. Thus t1 must go with the subsequent time. 
3) T1 must be included in the subsequent temporal interval (from 2 and the fact that 
the only other temporal interval it could be in is the subsequent one) 
Now let BC be the time of Socrates’ motion from Moschato to Athens. On the 
assumption that Socrates goes simultaneously from one actual motion to another, 
Socrates is moving from Moschato to Athens in the immediately successive temporal 
interval, so that time would immediately follow time AB. 
4) The subsequent temporal interval is temporal interval BC, over which Socrates is 
continuously moving from Moschato to Athens (ex hypothesi) 
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Note that the temporal interval BC does not include the instant of arrival at Athens, since, 
per the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule, this instant goes with the 
subsequent time and is one at which Socrates is no longer moving to Athens. These two 
premises then imply that: 
5) T1 is included in temporal interval BC (from 3 and 4) 
We can now draw out the implications that follow from t1 belonging to an interval of time 
in which Socrates is continuously moving from Moschato to Athens: 
6) Whenever Socrates is moving from Moschato to Athens, Socrates has moved 
away from Moschato and towards Athens (from VI 6, 236b33-34, on moving and 
having moved) 
7) Socrates has moved away from Moschato and towards Athens at t1 (from 4, 5, 
and 6) 
8) At t1, Socrates is at Moschato and not at Moschato (from 1 and 7) 
9) Socrates cannot be at and not be at Moschato at the same time (by definition) 
Therefore, 
10) 4) is false: BC is not the temporal interval that succeeds time AB and includes t1 
(from 8 and 9) 
T1 is not part of time BC and BC is not the temporal interval that succeeds time AB. But 
this means that t1 must be part of some other temporal interval that comes before BC, a 
temporal interval that will have to be an interval of rest. To further see this note that the 
Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule implies that there must be an initial limit to 
Socrates’ motion from Moschato to Athens that is outside of it. Following White, we can 
call this the instant of departure to Athens. Let t2 be the instant of departure after which 
Socrates has left Moschato, but at which he is still at Moschato. Then, 
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11) T2 is the last instant at which Socrates is at Moschato (ex hypothesi)  
But this implies that 
12) The whole time BC, the interval of time over which Socrates is moving from 
Moschato to Athens, is the time that succeeds t2 (from 11 and definition of instant 
of departure) 
But we just saw that BC is not the time that succeeds t1. Since they are succeeded by 
different temporal intervals, t1 and t2 cannot be the same. Instants are individuated by the 
times they bound, so instants that bound a different time cannot be the same. Thus 
13) T1 and t2 are not the same instant (from 10 and 12 and because different 
temporal intervals succeed them) 
But, 
14) Every time is separated from every other time by an interval of time. (by 
definition) 
Therefore, 
15) There is an interval of rest between t1, the instant of arrival, and t2, the instant of 
departure. (from 13 and 14) 
During the interval between the instant of Socrates’ arrival at Moschato and the instant of 
departure, t2, the instant after which he has left Moschato, he must rest at Moschato. 
Therefore, 
16) Socrates is at rest for the interval from t1 to t2. 
Therefore, 
17) The motion of Socrates from the Piraeus to Athens is not continuous. 
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I. Reflexive and Complex Rectilinear Motions  
At this point, the advocate of Zeno might present a revised objection by turning to 
reflexive motions or rectilinear motions in a series of distinct directions. Perhaps when 
the mobile is moving directly from A to C it would have to stop for an intermediate point 
on its route to be an actual midpoint. But consider cases where, after moving forward to 
B, the mobile then moves down to D or back to A. In these instances, B clearly serves as 
an actual terminus: the mobile’s intermediate goal is to get to B and once it arrives there 
it then moves in a different way, either back to A or down to D. In such cases, what 
prevents the instant of arrival from also being the instant at which the mobile starts its 
next motion, either back to A or down to D? Here, again, Aristotle can employ his rule to 
show that these complex rectilinear or reflexive motions must involve intervals of rest 
and thus cannot be continuous.31  
Consider a case where the mobile arrives at B and then moves downward to D. 
T3, the instant of arrival, is the first instant of having changed. At t3 the mobile is at B and 
has arrived at B. But, again, the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule means 
that t3 goes with the subsequent time. If during this whole subsequent time the mobile is 
moving to D, then at t3 it will have already moved away from B and towards D. But the 
mobile cannot have arrived at B and have moved away from B at the same instant. So 
again we have two distinct instants that must be separated by an interval of rest. Similar 
reasoning applies to the case of reflexive motion: the mobile cannot have arrived at B 
while simultaneously having moved back towards A and away from B. Thus even in 
                                                
31 Aristotle gives additional arguments for claiming complex rectilinear or reflexive 
motions cannot be continuous, but insists that the fact that motions requiring actual middles 
involve an interval of rest makes “most apparent,” (μάλιστα φανερόν), (262a12) the impossibility 
of such motions being continuous. 
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cases where the mobile changes directions at the actual middle, there must be an 
interval of rest, destroying the motion’s continuity. 
Aristotle goes on to use this result as the basis for a general rule that shows that 
only circular motion can be continuous: 
For circular motion is from the same to the same, but rectilinear motion is from 
the same to the other. And motion in a circle is never over the same [points], but 
rectilinear motion is repeatedly over the same [points]. It is possible for a thing 
that comes to be always in different points to move continuously; but it is not 
possible for a thing that comes to be repeatedly in the same points. (264b18-b28) 
 
Here Aristotle articulates what I will call the no-backtracking rule: 
No backtracking: if a motion from starting point A traces part of its course again 
before returning to the starting point A, that motion cannot be continuous.32 
 
This rule comes from Aristotle’s arguments for an interval of rest. When the mobile starts 
backtracking, whether this is by turning around at the end of a rectilinear motion, 
reversing course on a semicircle (264b24-5), or in some other way, the point of 
turnaround must be an actual middle. It is the actual end of the motion out and the 
beginning of the actual motion back. In consequence, the mobile must arrive at and 
depart from the turnaround point, necessitating an interval of rest (given the Changes 
are Open, Rests are Closed Rule) and destroying the continuity of the motion. No 
backtracking means that any movement of place that involves a retracing of steps will 
fail to be continuous. It gets Aristotle to the overall target of the chapter: the priority of 
circular motion.33 
                                                
32 As my formulation of this rule makes clear, I agree with Graham in restricting the claim 
that motion in a circle never covers the same points to the motion of a single revolution (Graham 
1999, 153-4). 
33 Aristotle had initially used the argument to rule out infinite rectilinear motion, paving the 
way for his claim that only circular motion can be infinite and continuous (Phys. VIII 8, 262a13-
263a4). Since Aristotle assumes that the universe is finite (as he argued at Phys. III 5; cf. Phys. III 
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 This principle also rules out the possibility of continuous series of alterations or 
continuous series of generation and corruption because these also involve actual 
middles. As we saw earlier, the white thing must actually come to be black in such a way 
that it is not at that same instant partly white again. Thus it must rest in this state for 
some finite time before turning back to white. Similarly, the dead thing must actually 
come to be alive and cannot be dead again at the same instant: it must rest in its living 
state for some finite time before dying again. This is the central ground for Aristotle’s 
rejection of the sort of continuous universal flux associated with Heraclitus and sketched 
out in the Theaetetus.34 If, as I have argued, Aristotle’s argument for rest follows from his 
rule, then Aristotle can directly apply it to alteration and substantial change to rule out 
perpetual flux.35 
J. Motions involving Multiple Movers 
I have articulated and defended Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that a continuous 
motion cannot be composed of actual sub-motions. I then argued that this reasoning 
applies both to reflexive rectilinear motions and rectilinear motions with multiple termini.  
We now need to consider a different kind of case that commentators raise. Both Graham 
and Rosen object to Aristotle’s reasoning by mentioning the example of violent projectile 
                                                                                                                                            
6 207a16-20), any infinite rectilinear motion would require turning around at some point i.e. 
moving rectilinearly in a different direction. 
Note that, as I suggested above, some motions that are not purely circular, such as 
elliptical motions, will be able to pass the No Backtracking test. However, these tests do rule out 
any motion that consists solely of some combination of rectilinear motions. 
34 Cf. Heraclitus B60; Theaetetus 152d-e, 160d and following. 
35 Graham recognizes that Aristotle’s rejection of flux seems to be appealing to his 
previous arguments about resting, but finds Aristotle’s reasoning for ruling out continuous cycles 
unconvincing, because Graham has not made found Aristotle’s earlier argument satisfactory 
(Graham 1999, 156-157). 
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motion: surely, the apple thrown upwards does not need to pause before coming down.36 
Considering this case helps to clarify Aristotle’s reasoning. Does the argument Aristotle 
gives in Physics VIII 8 imply that an apple thrown upwards pause before descending? I 
will examine the relevant conditions for Aristotle’s interval of rest argument by looking at 
this and several other putative counter-examples that commentators suggest. On my 
interpretation, Aristotle’s reasoning does not apply in these cases because the changes 
of direction occurring in them do not, in fact, occur as a result of actually distinct sub-
motions with their own termini. Instead, the relative powers of the multiple movers 
explain these changes of direction. Since the mobile need not have arrived at and then 
departed from any specific point, the interval of rest argument does not apply. In my 
view, Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that such motions cannot be everlasting and 
continuous rest on the definitional conditions he lays out for a motion to count as 
continuous, not on his argument for an interval of rest. Even if such motions are not 
divided in time, Aristotle insists they are not continuous because their movers are not 
sufficiently unified.  
On my reading, the uppermost point of the apple’s flight (20 feet, say) is not an 
actual middle in Aristotle’s sense, and thus is not governed by the Changes are Open, 
Rests are Closed Rule. This case is importantly dissimilar from the case of a mobile 
getting to its intermediate goal and reversing course (like the runner reaching the post 
marking the halfway point of the race and turning around). The runner’s motion consists 
of two sub-motions: the one to the halfway point and the one back from that point. The 
runner is only allowed to move back after she has arrived at the intermediate point. By 
                                                
36 Graham 1999, 142; Rosen, 206. 
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contrast, the apple does not perform one motion to a precise point 20 feet up in the air 
and then initiate a distinct sub-motion back down. Instead, for Aristotle, the ball’s motion 
is the result of two opposed powers, the power of the thrower that propelled it upwards 
and the ball’s heaviness that carries it back to the earth. Aristotle thinks that the 
combined effect of these two powers determines the ball’s trajectory (VII 2, 244a23025). 
The zenith of the ball’s motion does not play any explanatory role in its flight. It is not a 
terminus ad quem or terminus a quo. 
The relative unimportance of the point of maximum height can be brought out by 
considering a case where the ball is thrown forwards and slightly up e.g. thrown at a five-
degree angle. In this case, there will be some point in the course of the motion, call it H, 
at which the ball reaches its greatest vertical distance from the ground. Does the ball 
need to arrive at and depart from H, and thus rest at H? On my interpretation, Aristotle’s 
view does not require a pause in such a case because there are not actual sub-motions 
to and then away from H. H is not a terminus or a goal for which the ball is moving. It is 
just the point at which the ball happens to reach its greatest height, before the power of 
its heaviness overcomes the power of its upward propulsion. Since H is not a terminus, 
the ball need not arrive at or depart from H and the Changes are Open, Rests are 
Closed Rule is not relevant. We cannot rightly apply the Ancient Greek perfect in either 
of these scenarios, saying that the mobile has come to be at the zenith, because in both 
scenarios reaching this point is not an achievement that is the result and goal of the 
mobile’s prior motion. Instead, the zenith’s status as the highest point is coincidental on 
the way the relative motive powers interact. 
This clarification is relevant to several other suggested counter-examples. 
Suppose that Socrates is on a moving walkway propelling him forward at a velocity of 5 
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km/h, when he turns around and starts to walk the other way, continuously accelerating 
until he is walking at the velocity of 7 km/h. At the end of his acceleration Socrates will 
be moving at 2 km/h in a direction opposite to his initial course. At some point along this 
acceleration, Socrates’ own velocity will perfectly cancel out the velocity of the moving 
walkway, but there is no reason to think that he must pause for an interval of rest at this 
point. The point where the relative velocities cancelled each other out will not be a 
terminus a quo or ad quem. Since, again, there are no actual sub-motions to or from this 
point and it is not a continuing state or achievement that completes Socrates’ motion, 
Aristotle’s argument does not apply.37   
Graham presents another case in a similar vein: “contrary motion along a 
continuous sine wave.”38 For example, the position of a pendulum moving back and forth 
can be described using a sine wave: it seems to continuously move up to maximum 
amplitude and then back down, without pausing. Again, on my interpretation, the point of 
maximum amplitude does not serve as an actual middle in Aristotle’s sense and so the 
argument does not apply. The pendulum’s motion is produced by the interaction 
between two causes: the tension force pulling the pendulum towards its pivot point and 
the downward force of the pendulum’s weight. Neither force is directed at getting to the 
point of maximum amplitude. While it follows from the way that the pendulum’s tension 
and weight interact that there will be points of maximum amplitude, these points 
themselves do not play any special explanatory role. They do not serve as termini to 
which the pendulum is moving or from which it begins its motion. The points of maximum 
                                                
37 This type of example was helpfully suggested to me by an anonymous referee. 
38 Graham 1999, 152, cf. 132 
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amplitude are also not continuing states or achievement that complete the pendulum’s 
motion. So, once again, Aristotle’s case for an interval of rest does not apply.39 
More generally, then, in the case of any motion that does not involve multiple 
distinct termini, there need not be any interval of rest in between changes of direction. 
When multiple movers and the relative action of their powers explain why the mobile 
changes directions, the mobile’s motion is not explained in terms of sub-motions and 
thus it need not have arrived at and then departed from any specific point. The argument 
that has been our focus does not rule such motions out.  
On my reading of Phys VIII, Aristotle rules such cases out for other reasons. 
They are not continuous precisely because all these sorts of cases involve multiple 
causes of motion. In the case of the pendulum we have the tension pulling the pendulum 
towards the pivot point and the downward force of its weight; in the case of Socrates, we 
have the moving walkway and Socrates himself; and, in the case of the apple, we have 
the power of the thrower and the heaviness of the apple. Aristotle uses the multiple 
causes at work in such cases to maintain that they cannot count as continuous unified 
motions. 
 For Aristotle, projectile motions may appear continuous, because they consist of 
a series of contiguous motions with no temporal gaps in between, but they are not (Phys 
VIII 10, 267a13-14). To rule out their continuity Aristotle does not appeal to the sort of 
interval of rest reasoning he employs in VIII 8, but to the fact that, on his theory, the thing 
causing the motion is not one (VIII 10, 267a14-15). On Aristotle’s theory of projectile 
motion, the original mover (e.g. the person throwing the apple) not only moves the 
                                                
39 Cf. Galileo 1954, p. 254. 
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projectile and the medium immediately surrounding it (e.g. the surrounding air), it imparts 
its power of movement to the part of the medium it is in contact with (so the surrounding 
air now has a power to move the apple in the direction that the person threw it). (267a2-
12) The apple is originally moved by the person’s hand. After leaving the person’s hand, 
however, the apple is moved by the air that was moved by the hand, which then imparts 
its power of movement to the air that is now in contact with the ball and so on. On 
Aristotle’s view, when the power of movement cannot be fully imparted to each 
successive phase of the medium, the power of the medium’s phases to move the 
projectile will gradually diminish. When this power is wholly gone, the projectile will 
cease moving (267a9-12). 
Given this account, Aristotle maintains that the movement of a projectile is not 
continuous because the mover is not one thing, but a series of contiguous things (the 
original mover, followed by a contiguous series of phases of the medium). Aristotle’s 
definition of continuous motion, given in V 4, 228b2-4 and referred back to in book VIII 
(e.g. VIII 8, 262a2-3), required that the motion be of one thing (ἑνός), where this 
requires that the thing being moved be one and that the mover be one. Projectile motion 
fails to meet this last condition. Similarly, the multiple movers involved in the case of the 
pendulum or Socrates on the walkway prevents them from meeting the definition. A lack 
of temporal gaps is not enough for continuity. 
Aristotle carefully sets his own astronomy up to meet his conditions. While 
contemporary physics takes regular planetary orbits to be produced by the interactions 
of two bodies, with an elliptical orbit being the result of the interaction of the velocity, 
position, and mass of the sun with that of the planet, Aristotle’s understanding is 
importantly different. For him, the motion of the heavens is produced by a number of 
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spheres. Each sphere has its own unified motion that it continuously undertakes (though 
the motions of some of the inner spheres counteract the motion of some of the outer 
spheres) and each of these motions is produced by a single mover. (Metaphysics Λ 8, 
1074a1-17).  
Aristotle also appeals to the unity of motion in VIII 8 itself. At several points, 
Aristotle appeals to a principle about the unitary and harmonious goals of a continuous 
locomotion, with the clearest statement coming from the following passage:  
For everything which is moving continuously, if it is not put off by anything, was 
being borne earlier to what it went to by locomotion, e.g., if it went to B, it was 
also being borne to B, and not just when it was near, but as soon as it began to 
be moved; for why now rather than earlier? (264a9-14) 
 
Here Aristotle is claiming that a continuously moving mobile can be said to be moving 
towards its goal for the whole time of the motion, from the very beginning to the end. For 
example, the runner moving from T to V can be said to be moving to V at any time during 
his run. On my view, Aristotle takes this to follow from his stipulation that a continuous 
motion be “the motion of one thing and in one time and in what is undivided according to 
species.” (VIII 8, 262a2-3; cf. V 4, 228b2-4) If the mobile was only moving towards its 
goal in one part of the motion, then the other part of its motion would be of a different 
species, since it has a different goal, and motions are differentiated by their goals. We 
can formulate the general rule as follows: 
Always Goal-Directed: the mobile, while engaged in continuous motion, can 
always be said to be moving towards every terminus of that motion. 
Aristotle uses this rule to provide another argument that reflexive motion cannot be 
continuous (264a14-264b1) and also employs it to rule out constant flux (264b4-9).  
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This rule would prevent motions with multiple movers from being continuous. 
Either they have multiple different termini or they have no terminus. If they have multiple 
termini, then they would have to be always moving towards each of the termini, but they 
are not. In the case of reflexive motion, the mobile is first moving away from A and 
towards B and then moving away from B and towards A: the two phases have different 
and conflicting termini. In the case of complex rectilinear motion, the mobile is not 
moving down towards D while moving forward to B and vice versa. If, however, there are 
cases without defined termini, such as the motion of the pendulum or the apple, they, 
too, fail to be goal directed by lacking any goals or termini that define and delimit their 
motion. Thus they would not possess the kind of unified species necessary to count as 
continuous. On my reading, Aristotle’s position here rests on different grounds than his 
argument about sub-motions.  
So, on my interpretation, the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule does 
not apply to cases of projectile motion or motions with multiple movers. Aristotle’s claim 
that multiple interacting movers cannot produce a continuous motion succeeds or fails 
on a different basis. Aristotle requires a single motive cause and a single species of 
motion with a single goal for continuity and this rules such motions out. He does not, 
however, need to claim that such motions involve temporal interruptions. 
K. Conclusion 
Aristotle sums up his Phys. VIII 8 response to Zeno’s dichotomy paradox in this 
way: 
So, to the one asking whether it is possible to go through infinite things (ἄπειρα), 
either in time or in length, one must say that in a way it is and in a way it is not. 
For if the things are in actuality (ἐντελεχείᾳ) it is not possible, but if they are in 
potentiality (δυνάμει) it is possible. For someone who moves continuously has 
gone through infinite things incidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς), but not without 
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qualification (ἁπλῶς δ’ οὔ). For it belongs incidentally to the line to be infinite 
halves, but its substance (οὐσία) and being (τὸ εἶναι) is different.40 (VIII 8, 
263b3-8) 
 
We are now in a position to better understand Aristotle’s response to Zeno. In one 
sense, Aristotle accommodates the classical modern response to Zeno: the mobile does 
go through infinitely many points in a way, since there is no limit to the number of points 
it occupies at different instants. This is what Aristotle means when he says that the 
mobile goes through the infinite δυνάμει, in capacity.41 If we take Zeno as claiming that 
any motion is infinitely divisible, his claim is true, but unproblematic. If we take Zeno to 
be claiming that any motion is composed of an infinite number of actual motions, 
Aristotle insists that he is making a false claim. It would be problematic if it were true, 
but, in fact, a whole continuous motion cannot be composed of multiple actual motions. If 
Socrates were actually moving to the midpoint, he would have to arrive at and depart 
from the midpoint, necessitating rest.  
To defend Aristotle’s reasoning, I laid out his Changes are Open, Rests are 
Closed Rule and showed that it is consistent with his views on the beginning of change 
in book VI. On my interpretation of Aristotle’s argument, he argues that the instant of 
arrival, the first instant at which the mobile has come to be at the actual middle, cannot 
be part of the subsequent time of motion. If it were, the mobile would be moving towards 
the next terminus and thus would need to have already left. This means that the instant 
of arrival must be separated from the time of departure by an interval of rest. My 
interpretation of the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule allowed us to make 
                                                
40 The last line of this passage nicely brings out the fact that Aristotle’s response here is 
in line with his general view about continuous things. For Aristotle the endpoints of a line are there 
in actuality, but the points in between are there in potentiality, they are not there in full actuality 
until the line is divided. Cf. Metaphysics Δ 11, 1019a7-11. 
41 Cf. Coope 2012. 
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good sense of the text of Aristotle’s argument for thinking that the mobile must stop at an 
actual middle. I then showed how Aristotle’s reasoning applies generally to rule out any 
continuous reflexive motion or continuous complex rectilinear motion. On my 
interpretation, however, the argument does not apply to every change of direction. 
When, as in the case of projectile motion, multiple movers and their relative powers 
explain why the mobile changes directions, distinct sub-motions are not involved. 
Aristotle holds that such motions cannot be continuous, not because they involve 
intervals of rest, but because they involve multiple causes of motion. 
Aristotle is correct about the implications of his views on change: his rule implies 
that there cannot be successive actual sub-motions without intervals of rest. Given that 
most interpreters take Aristotle’s position to beg the question or rest on a premise that is 
obviously mistaken, this is meaningful interpretative progress. By providing an account of 
Aristotle’s reasoning based on a rule that follows from his general account of change and 
also has some intrinsic plausibility, I have shown that Aristotle’s position is more 
defensible and plausible than commentators currently acknowledge, even if the rule on 
which he relies can be challenged. Aristotle’s view of change implies that continuous 
motions cannot be composed out of multiple actual motions with different termini. In a 
truly continuous motion, the mobile does not actually arrive at and depart from each half-
distance but goes through them all in capacity (δυνάμει) by going through the whole 
distance and actually arriving at the end.42 
                                                
42 I would like to thank Benjamin Morison for providing extensive feedback and direction 
on an ancestor of this paper and Samuel Baker, Hendrik Lorenz, and John Cooper for their 
beneficial suggestions and comments. I received helpful questions and suggestions on earlier 
versions of this material from audiences at a 2009 Princeton Philosophical Society meeting, the 
2010 Fordham Graduate Philosophy Conference, the 2010 Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 
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Annual Meeting, the 2011 Central Division APA meeting, and Boston University’s Department of 
Philosophy. I am also grateful for very useful comments and challenges from several referees. 
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